Getting rid of data brokers wouldn't solve *all* our problems, but it sure would go a long way to solving *many* of them. Rather than legally requiring platforms to spy on kids (to exclude them from being targeted by platforms' algorithms), we could prohibit platforms from spying on *anyone*, including kids, meaning kids couldn't be identified (much less targeted) by algorithms or ads:

pluralistic.net/2026/06/23/des…

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Data brokers produce mountains of raw material used for every form of scam and torture. It's data brokers who power the gig economy's "algorithmic wage discrimination" system, where nurses and other workers are offered less pay based on how much credit card debt they're carrying:

pluralistic.net/2024/12/18/loo…

Banning data brokers would make great sense, which is why Biden's CFPB banned data brokers (only to have Trump un-ban them):

pluralistic.net/2025/05/15/ass…

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So the feds (both Congress and the executive branch) have surrendered, and that leaves states alone on the battlefield fighting the privacy wars alone. State legislatures have taken some big steps, but - crucially - they've stopped short of banning data brokers from operating within their borders. Having taken a ban on data brokers off the table, states are left with complex, often unworkable "compromises" that go nowhere.

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This is where DROP comes in. DROP stands for "Delete Request and Opt-out Platform," and it's a new phase of California's privacy regime that kicks off next month. Under DROP, you fill in some paperwork and then the state requires every data brokerage operating in California to delete your data, as well as any inferences they've made about you based on that data:

eff.org/deeplinks/2026/07/what…

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Protect Your Privacy with California's DROP Tool

Are you a California resident? Then we've got exciting news for you: there's a tool just for you that lets you take a single, relatively easy step to protect your privacy. It's called a DROP request.

^{Electronic Frontier Foundation}

Implementing DROP is nowhere near as good as banning data brokers. The idea that data brokers should be able to collect, retain and process your data unless you tell them not to implies that everyone starts off wanting to be spied on, and therefore data brokers should assume that unless they hear otherwise, we're delighted to be the subject of commercial surveillance. This is an incredibly stupid supposition, contradicted by all available evidence.

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For example, when Apple offered iPhone owners a one-click option to block Facebook from spying on them, 96% of iPhone owners clicked the button:

applescoop.org/story/facebook-…

Indeed, given this fact, one wonders why Apple bothers with the "don't spy on me" button at all. Why not have a "*do* spy on me" button that is unchecked by default, and leave users to dig through their settings to find the option to opt in to being surveilled?

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Of course, then it would make the fact that *Apple* spies on its customers and uses the data to target ads (with *no* way to opt out) a little awkward:

pluralistic.net/2022/11/14/lux…

In the absence of a ban on surveillance without explicit, opt-in consent, we are left with the bizarre fiction that most of us want to be spied on, a fiction that pervades the DROP process, making the entire procedure nearly impossible to complete.

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To start the DROP process, you must first create a Login.gov ID. This is an incredibly invasive process that involves photographing multiple pieces of ID and taking several selfies using special apps and webpages that hijack your device's camera and processor in a bid to prevent bad actors from spoofing the process.

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There's a plausible reason for this rigmarole: Login.gov is the authentication system for multiple federal, state and local IT systems in the US, so a fake or stolen Login.gov ID could be used to access your IRS, Social Security, and other very sensitive accounts.

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The corollary of this is the promise of Login.gov: once you create your ID (a lengthy, multi-stage process) you won't have to jump through lots of painful bureaucratic hoops to access a wide variety of government services.

DROP didn't get the memo.

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After you log in to DROP via Login.gov, you are sent a text message - to the phone number in your Login.gov profile - with a link to access a "secure" website that takes over your camera to let you take a "secure" photo of the front and back of your California driver's license or your US passport. What if you don't have either of those? I guess that means you want to be spied on by data brokers.

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Note that these are the *same* credentials you have to supply to get the Login.gov ID that you've just used to get to this step in the process. In other words, in order to get to the stage where they ask you to photograph your driver's license, *you have to have already photographed and validated your driver's license*.

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Once you complete this (pointless, redundant) step, you're directed back to your computer, where the process continues. Here, you must fill in all kinds of biographical detail, as well as specialized pieces of information, including your car's VIN. This is a piece of information that most people don't have - but which the California DMV *does* have and could auto-feed into the system, given that you've repeatedly affirmatively identified yourself to the service.

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You *also* have to provide your mobile advertising identifier, a long, unique number that you may or may not be able to extract from your phone, depending on the model and the OS version. If you can't get it that way, you can install an app like AAID, which comes with a long list of - you guessed it - permissions to extract, store and process your private information.

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Here's the thing: the whole point of a mobile ad identifier is that *apps can access it* (this is how they identify and track you). That step, where the system made you switch to your phone and use your camera to photograph your driver's license? That step could have *automatically* pulled this data off your device. That's the *whole fucking point of this exercise*: that web-pages and apps can request your mobile ad identifier.

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Instead, DROP wants users to dig through their phone's deepest settings and/or install an app to retrieve a 32-digit number, which they then must key into a webform on their computer or in a different app on their phone.

Once you've done this, you must fill in *another* page of biographical information, including information that you've already provided to Login.gov *and* information you've already filled in on previous screens.

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On this screen, you must also verify your phone number by sending yourself a text and then pasting in a unique number the system sends to you. But remember how this whole thing started? The first step is that you authenticate with Login.gov, which *sends a text to your phone* so you can take a (redundant) picture of your driver's license. There is *no way* you could get this far in the process unless you controlled the phone number you've just "verified" with the system.

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Next, you must verify your *email address*, by receiving an email with a unique code in it and keying or pasting *that* into the webform, too. Again, remember how this process started: with you logging in with Login.gov, *using your email address*, which the system has *already* treated as verified since the very start of this (very) long and (very) complicated process.

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This whole thing is *terrible*, predicated on the absurd premise that Californians need defending from the threat of strangers who pretend to be them *in order to sneakily opt them out of surveillance*. DROP requires stronger authentication than any other US system I've ever interacted with. I file my tax returns with fewer authentication steps. I renew my car's DMV registration with fewer authentication steps. *I became a US citizen* with fewer authentication steps.

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