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Man Charged for Wiping Phone Before CBP Could Search It


in reply to InternetCitizen2

GrapheneOS has a secret pin feature that wipes the phone when entered. So if someone takes your phone and demands your pin you can destroy the contents of the phone. GrapheneOS works on Pixel phones, given they are an activist, I wonder if this is what happened 🤔
in reply to Greg Clarke

Currently running GOS and not using that feature. Thinking about it now.
in reply to Greg Clarke

I feel like it should also open into a fake account that looks like a real account so they are busy on that while the real account is getting deleted. They should probably start with items listed by the user as important to delete first.
in reply to altphoto

What would be really cool is if also started streaming both cameras and the microphone. And changed your background image to be pro Trump.
in reply to Greg Clarke

what would be really cool is if it binned the storage keys for one user and not the other, silently. That way you could actually protect your data, without being martyred.

They'd have to prove a lot in the first instance to warrant arresting you then and there, like that the knew you'd done it

in reply to med

They’d have to prove a lot in the first instance to warrant arresting you then and there


No? It's been pretty clear they can arrest literally anyone and you're lucky if you even get to see a judge before you're shipped off to the concentration camps. Even in the cases where judges have gone out of their ways to file injunctions against the ICE on someone's behalf they won't give a shit and have no problems blatantly violating court order and disappearing anyway.

This entry was edited (2 days ago)
in reply to HiddenLayer555

I'm aware of what's happening in the states. I'm talking from a resourcing perspective. You'd already have to know what you were after to confirm its absence from the phone, if the wipe can be done silently.

If you could load in to your dummy profile, while deleting the keys to your main profile, which could then be freed up as storage space, all silently, with the right unlock password, that'd be pretty hard to prove in a way that warranted arresting everyone.

This would limit this charge to only those that announced it as a political statement or who were already being targeted specifically.

in reply to med

what would be really cool is if it binned the storage keys for one user and not the other, silently. That way you could actually protect your data, without being martyred.


If you leave the primary account 'blank' and use a secondary account for your personal use then you can do that.

When you logout of a secondary profile, GrapheneOS zeroes the keys from memory so that even an attacker with full control of the phone could not retrieve the keys unless you entered your password to re-generate them.

in reply to FauxLiving

I assumed that the primary account had full control over secondary user profiles, will have to revisit and confirm - thanks for the tip!
in reply to Greg Clarke

Sounds like a good place for an API hook that executes whatever contingency script you want on entering of the fake password.
This entry was edited (2 days ago)
in reply to Greg Clarke

That reminds me a bit of the Undercover mode in Kali Linux. It doesn't wipe anything, but it changes the desktop to look like Windows lol.
This entry was edited (2 days ago)
in reply to altphoto

I feel like it should also open into a fake account that looks like a real account so they are busy on that while the real account is getting deleted. They should probably start with items listed by the user as important to delete first.


It doesn't bother with files. The GrapheneOS wipe process deletes (by overwriting with 0s) the encryption headers on the drive and zeros the keys out of memory before shutting down.

You should never, ever allow anyone access to your unlocked phone that you don't trust. Even an otherwise smartphone could be exploited if it is unlocked because it exposes a much larger attack surface.

in reply to Greg Clarke

Thanks for informing us about this. I just set my duress PIN and password.
in reply to Greg Clarke

There was a recent post on Reddit that a person was relying on Duress PIN, and when forced to unlock a device, he used the said duress PIN instead, to his amusement the phone quietly unlocked itself and was happily inspected by the authorities.
I am curious if anyone tested that feature in a real life scenario
in reply to Archy

I remember that -- the guy provided no real evidence. I wouldn't trust it that easily given the number of groups who hate that things like Graphene exist.
in reply to Greg Clarke

You could set the duress pin to your birthdate, so your not the one who's deleting the data. Saw that tip on here and was kinda impressed.
in reply to InternetCitizen2

They don't explain enough about the circumstances of the arrest or how the phone was wiped. As far as I'm concerned that's probably because the law enforcement entity mismanaged the situation and supposed "evidence" and are now trying to pin whatever they can on the guy.

It's stupid that they can just do this with no actual evidence and just an accusation with no factual information provided.

This entry was edited (3 days ago)
in reply to InternetCitizen2

Haven't things like Cellebrite machines been able to almost fully recover data even after a format since basically ever? Most phones aren't zeroing out the SSD on factory reset AFAIK, might not even format the partitions.
This entry was edited (2 days ago)
in reply to HiddenLayer555

Most phones aren’t zeroing out the SSD on factory reset AFAIK, might not even format the partitions.


He was using a Pixel and he fast wiped the phone. That means that he was probably using Graphene OS and entered the duress password when the agents told him to unlock his phone. See: grapheneos.org/features#duress

in reply to HiddenLayer555

wait can it? I thought most resets nuke the keystore to prevent the decryption key from being seen. Thats concerning.
in reply to HiddenLayer555

Most phones are full disk encrypted. So they don't need to zero out the whole disk... They just need to zero out the part of the disk that stores the encryption key. Once the encryption key is erased, the rest of the disk is essentially random noise.