I often see that question about the way I use #E2EE over #ActivityPub.
#FediHood and #HolosSocial do not use the end-to-end encryption #Mastodon is working on. They are going for MLS over ActivityPub. I use the Signal Protocol, already working between Holos and FediHood, which I both maintain. Once MLS is available, I'll happily switch.
But to be clear: it works perfectly with the Signal Protocol. The switch would only be for compatibility.
#FediHood and #HolosSocial do not use the end-to-end encryption #Mastodon is working on. They are going for MLS over ActivityPub. I use the Signal Protocol, already working between Holos and FediHood, which I both maintain. Once MLS is available, I'll happily switch.
But to be clear: it works perfectly with the Signal Protocol. The switch would only be for compatibility.
Kraken
in reply to Fedilab Apps • • •Fedilab Apps
in reply to Kraken • • •Honestly, I checked the FEPs before and didn't see one about Matrix, otherwise I would have looked into it more deeply.
As for my choice, I stayed on the Signal double ratchet mainly for forward secrecy: a compromised key should not open the history.
Wachoperro
in reply to Fedilab Apps • • •@analytics
I think Matrix shouldn't be a source of trust for anything security related :s
soatok.blog/2024/08/14/securit…
(In the addendum:)
Matrix dev: meanwhile, it is very unclear that any sidechannel attack on a libolm based client is practical over the network (which is why we didn’t fix this years ago). After all, the limited primitives are commented on in the readme and github.com/matrix-org/olm/issu… since day 1.
Soatok: "So the Matrix developers already knew about these vulnerabilities, but deliberately didn’t fix them, for years
Congratulations, you’ve changed my stance. It used to be “I don’t consider Matrix a Signal alternative and they’ve had some embarrassing and i
... Show more...@analytics
I think Matrix shouldn't be a source of trust for anything security related :s
soatok.blog/2024/08/14/securit…
(In the addendum:)
Matrix dev: meanwhile, it is very unclear that any sidechannel attack on a libolm based client is practical over the network (which is why we didn’t fix this years ago). After all, the limited primitives are commented on in the readme and github.com/matrix-org/olm/issu… since day 1.
Soatok: "So the Matrix developers already knew about these vulnerabilities, but deliberately didn’t fix them, for years
Congratulations, you’ve changed my stance. It used to be “I don’t consider Matrix a Signal alternative and they’ve had some embarrassing and impactful crypto bugs but otherwise I don’t care”. Now it’s a stronger stance:
Don’t use Matrix.
I had incorrectly assumed ignorance, when it was in fact negligence.
There’s no reasonable world in which anyone should trust the developers of cryptographic software (i.e., libolm) that deliberately ships with side-channels for years, knowing they’re present, and never bother to fix them."
Use better AES/SHA implementations
richvdh (GitHub)