Can the #TOR #network still be described as #secure - according to my #analysis, no, it is not!

You may remember the news that the German #police deanomized a Tor user. A good online friend of mine sent me this summary, which contains all the important data on the subject: marx.wtf/2024/10/10/law-enforc…

What surprises me is that the whole #truth is nowhere to be found and even those responsible at TOR do not go into the full extent of the #misery in their #statement. Since this is not the case, I am inclined to assume a #conspiracy that could put future #whistleblowers without technical background knowledge in danger. I am therefore sharing my #knowledge with you here and drawing your attention to the #dangers.

First of all, I would like to point out that it takes very little these days to show up on the #NSA's radar as a suspected #cyberterrorist. The Department of #Defense (DOD) considers protests an example of "low-level #terrorism" (source: aclu.org/news/national-securit…). Human rights activists and journalists keep finding bugging #software on their smartphones, even though they are actually the good guys. So it would be nice if the TOR network could provide the necessary #security.

#Attack options for #deanonymization at TOR

1) #Timing attack: This attack uses control over a large part of the Internet, which the NSA undoubtedly has. Interruptions of various lengths are placed on all #subnetwork cables. If you then have real-time #communication via TOR, you can measure these #delays and find out which cable the traffic is coming from and thus narrow down the #region. If you know the approximate #location, you can check the #providers there to see who was using TOR at the time.
2) #Server #control: You try to control a large part of the servers in the Tor network. If many #connections are routed via your own servers, you can measure the #timing of real-time communications as well as the size of the connection packets to establish a correlation between #sender and #receiver. #Traffic is therefore routed through different countries, but this does not increase safety. Even if the servers are located in #Russia, they may still be paid by the #CIA and therefore also monitored by the CIA.

Necessary #countermeasures that are not provided

1) To prevent timing attacks, a random delay would have to be built into every transmission.
2) All packages must be the same size so that no correlation is possible via the package size.
3) Fake packets would have to be sent constantly so that real-time communication cannot be recognized.
4) There should be many more trustworthy servers that are not under the control of the state's secret services.

Some of this could be implemented easily, others would cost money and traffic and thus slow down the network. I have it on good authority that the TOR #project was made aware of these dangers many years ago. The TOR project has now been in existence for 22 years and the #monitoring options have evolved to the detriment of #freedom. The NSA is now able to monitor the majority of the #Internet and today's TOR defensive measures are no longer sufficient, so that even the German police are able to deanonymize users.

Under these circumstances, I cannot recommend whistleblowers, #dissidents and #resistance fighters to use TOR if they are dependent on #anonymity!

#danger #problem #cybercrime #cybersecurity #dissident #whistleblower #journalism #press #humanrights #fbi #dod #pentagon #terrorism #terror #surveillance #tracking #defense #politics